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Abstract
　The purpose of this paper is to test whether the ‘bribe model’ as an explanation for why 
adult children live with their parents is valid in Japan. The bribe model argues that while 
parents are happy to live with their young adult child, adult children do not wish to live 
with their parents. As a result, parents have to ‘bribe’ their children with ﬁnancial or non-
ﬁnancial transfers to induce them to live with them. Using micro data from the National 
Family Research of Japan （KazokunitsuitenoZenkokuChousa） 1998 and 2003, we examine 
the eﬀect of parental income on the propensity of young adult children to live with their 
parents, and investigate how co-residency aﬀects the life satisfaction of parents and child. 
There are two main challenges in estimating the eﬀects of parental income on the propen-
sity of children to live with their parents. First, there is a potential endogeneity problem 
between the likelihood of children to live with their parents and parental income. Second, 
data on parental income is not available for children who live on their own. In order to 
deal with these two potential problems, we use the two sample instrumental variable 
（TSIV） method. The ﬁndings suggest that parental income has a negative not statistically 
signiﬁcant impact on the propensity to cohabit in Japan. While children seem to be indiﬀer-
ent toward co-residence with their parents, co-residence has negative impacts on the mar-
riage satisfaction and sex life satisfaction of parents. Thus, for parents’privacy is a normal 
good in Japan, and the bribe model is not applicable to the Japanese case.
Keywords : Living arrangement, intra-household transfers, parental income, two sample in-
strumental variable （TSIV） method
１．INTRODUCTION
　The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the controversial question of how parental in-
come aﬀectsthe living arrangements of parents and their young adult children. In many 
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developed countries, young adults are delaying their nest-leaving. There is a clear trend 
that more young adults are delaying their residential independence from their parental 
home, especially among Mediterranean youth （see, for example, Cobb-Clark 2008, Giuliano 
2007, and Manacorda and Moretti, 2006）.
　Similar trends are also observed in Japan （see Figure 1）. In 1980, the co-residency rate 
for young Japanese aged between 20 and 34 was 29.5％ , and this had increased to 46.2％ 
by 2008. The co-residency rate is much higher for single adult children. According to the 
2002 White Paper on the National Lifestyle, in 2001, about 70％ of single adults lived with 
their parents. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to the issue in the media, there 
are few empirical studies investigating whether the trend in Japan is due to changes in 
the preferences of youth or due to falls in income associated withdemand shocks and the 
casualization of the workforce. In addition, it is unclear how parental income aﬀects living 
arrangements.
　Numerous studieshave been undertaken in Europe and North America to examine why 
young people delay their nest-leaving. One stream of this research seeks an explanation for 
this delay by examining labour market conditions （McElroy, 1985, Card and Lemieux, 2000 
and Becker et al., 2008）. Some empirical evidence suggests that high housing prices and 
high rents have an inﬂuence on living arrangements （Haurin et al., 1993, and Ermisch, 
1999）. Guiso and Jappelli （2002） argue that severe imperfections in the mortgage market 
in Italy lead to young adults delaying their nest-leaving. Fogli （2004） provides evidence 
that young people choose to live with their parents when there is a high degree of em-
ployment protection and severe credit constraints. Delaying residential independence en-
ables young adults to consume, save and invest even when they face credit constraints 
（Cox, 1990, Ermisch, 2003, and Fogli, 2004）.
　All of these studies try to unravel why young adults live with their parents and what 
beneﬁts the young adults obtain from co-residing with their parents. However, it is diﬃcult 
to say that the same amount of attention has been paid to why parents accept the delay 
in their children’s nest-leaving and what they gain （or lose） in exchange for the co-resi-
dence. This paper investigates why Japanese parents live with a single young adult child 
and what the parents gain from the co-residence with a single young adult. Although we 
do not deny the importance of the factors inﬂuencing the children’s behavior, in this paper, 
we will particularly focus on the preferences of parents and intra-household transfers.
　There are some studies which highlight what parents gain/lose from co-residence with 
their adult children in terms of their satisfaction and ﬁnancial transfers. Aquilino and Sup-
ple （1991） argue that co-residence with an unemployed or ﬁnancially dependent adult child 
increases conﬂict between the parents and the child. Blanco and Kluv （2002） indicate that 
in Denmark, The Netherlands and Spain the nest-leaving of their child increases parental 
satisfaction with their housing situation. Ermisch （2003） contends that young people are 
more likely to live in the parental home when parental income increases, and less likely to 
live in the parental home when their own income increases. Manacorda and Moretti （2005） 
argue that in Italy, parents prefer to live with their young adult children and they ‘bribe’ 
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their adult children, who prefer to live on their own, to live with them. Their empirical ev-
idence suggests that parental income has positive eﬀects on co-residence with a son. On 
the other hand, Rosenzweig and Wolpin （1993） suggest that the opposite is true in the U. S. 
as parental income decreases co-residence rates, and argue that American parents prefer 
to live on their own.
　In this paper, we will focus on the bribe model of Manacorda and Moretti （2005） as it 
explains the preference of parents for co-residence with their children and intergenerational 
ﬁnancial transfers simultaneously. Using data from two surveys, the National Family Re-
search of Japan 1998 and 2003 （NFRJ 1998 and NFRJ 2003 hereafter）, this paper estimates 
the eﬀects of parental income on propensity of young adult Japanese children to live with 
their parents, and the eﬀects of the co-residence on life satisfaction of both parents and 
child. There are two main challenges in estimating the eﬀects of parental income on the 
propensity of children to live with their parents : an endogeneity problem between the like-
lihood of living with one’s parents and parental income ; and the lack of data on parental 
income for children who live on their own. In order to deal with these potential problems, 
we use the two sample instrumental variable （TSIV） method proposed by Angrist and 
Krueger （1992）.
　The relationship between the living arrangements and intergenerational ﬁnancial trans-
fers is important forJapanese tax policy as the Japanese tax system provides a deduction 
for dependents. The head of a household can claima dependent deduction for each depen-
dent who earns 1.03 million yen or less. Eligibility for the dependent deduction is not lim-
ited on the basis of the age of the dependent. A positive eﬀect of parental income on co-
residency implies ﬁnancial transfers from parents to their child, and the dependent 
deduction which reduces the ﬁnancial burden of dependents, may be justiﬁable. However, if 
parental income has a negative impact on co-residence, there is possibility that parents 
may support their children to live on their own. If parents and their child do not live to-
gether, the head of the household cannot claim the deduction for dependents. If there are 
income transfers from parents to their child who are living separately, some of the govern-
mental aid to young people may need to be shifted to their parents.
　Some Japanese call single young people who continue to live with their parents after 
completing their education “parasite singles” （Yamada, 1999）. On the other hand, Genda 
（2006） argues that the increases in the co-residency rate are due to the collapse of the 
bubble economy and poor labour market conditions for the youth. If the bribe model is 
valid, the delay in nest-leaving of Japanese youth may be because parents discourage their 
children from becoming independent.
　This paper’s ﬁndings suggest that parental income appears to have a negative impact on 
the propensity to cohabit in Japan, which implies that Japanese parents prefer to live on 
their own, that is, privacy is a normal good for parents. Our empirical evidence also sug-
gests that Japanese parents are more likely to be dissatisﬁed with their life and marriage 
when they live with a young adult child, but young adult children seem to be indiﬀerent 
toward this co-residence. The bribe model is not applicable to the Japanese case.
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　The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Section 2 outlinesthe methodologi-
cal framework used in this paper. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports and dis-
cusses the estimation results. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
２．METHODOLOGY
　The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, this paper estimates the eﬀect of parental in-
come on co-residency. Second, this paper examines the eﬀects of the co-residence on satis-
faction of parents and their children. In this section, we discuss the identiﬁcation strategy 
used in estimating the eﬀects of parental income on the co-residence by the TSIV method. 
Then, we introduce the ordered Probit models used to estimate the eﬀects of co-residency 
on the life satisfaction of parents and children.
２.１.　The Eﬀect of Parental Income on Co-residency
　Our ultimate goal is to estimate β1 in the following equation :
　　　Hi＝β0＋β1YPi＋Xi’β2＋ui,  ⑴　　
where Hi is a dummy variable which takes the value unity if in family i an adult child 
lives with his/her parents, YPi is parental income, Xi is a set of control variables, and ui is 
a normally distributed error term. If parents have a taste for living with their adult chil-
dren, then β1＞0. If parents prefer to live on their own, then the privacy of parents can be 
seen as being a normal good and β1＜0.
　There are two issues that need to be treated when estimating the eﬀects of parental in-
come on co-residency. First, there is a potential endogeneity problem between co-residency 
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Figure 1 : Proportion of Single Young People （Aged 20―34） Living with Their Parent（s）
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and parental income. Second, when we estimate equation ⑴ using a sample of children we 
lack data on parental income for those children who live on their own. In order to address 
these two potential problems, Manacorda and Moretti （2005） apply Angrist and Krueger’s 
（1992） two sample instrumental variable （TSIV） method.
　We also use the TSIV method to solve this two layered problem. In applying TSIV, the 
instrument Z for YPi and the covariates X must be available for both children who live 
with their parents and for those who live on their own. Given such an instrument Z, β1 
can be estimated in two steps. First, we use aparent sample to estimatea reduced form pa-
rental income equation :
　　　YPi＝γ0＋γ1Zi＋Xi’γ2＋ei.  ⑵　　
　Using equation ⑵ , we can estimate the eﬀects of Z on parental income. Then, we use a 
children sample to estimate the following reduced formco-residence equation :
　　　Hi＝θ0＋θ1Zi＋Xi’θ2＋vi.  ⑶　　
　Bycombining ⑴ and ⑵ , it can be easilyshown that in ⑶ θ1＝β1γ1, so that given consis-
tent estimates of γ1 and θ1, we can easily obtain a consistent estimator of β1 （see Angrist 
and Krueger （1992））.
　For parents, NFRJ 1998 and NFRJ 2003 contain information on variables such as age, ed-
ucation, employment status and marital status, and we use the years of education of the 
father as an instrument for the parent’s income. In applying TSIV, the instrument Z and 
the set of controls X must be available for both children who live with their parents and 
those who live on their own as well as for their parents. As a result, the choice of X is in-
evitably limited. We include the father’s age and mother’s age （or husband’s age and wife’s 
age for parents’ sample）.
　Moreover, using the parents’ sample, we will estimate a simple Probit model of ⑴ ignor-
ing the endogeneity of parental income to check the robustness of the TSIV estimator. We 
estimate the eﬀects of parental income on the propensity of parents to live with at least 
one adult child with the following set of control variables : ethe husband’s age and age 
squared, the wife’s age and age squared, the husband’s health status, the wife’s health sta-
tus, and the number of children.
　We use the parents’ sample to estimate thisProbit model because it contains parental in-
come for both parents living with their child and parents living on their own. With the 
children’s sample, information on the parental income for those children who live on their 
own is not available.
　One of the problems in estimating a Probit model with the parent’s sample is that some 
parents live with more than one single adult children. Thus, we create the following dum-






 １ if lives with at least one single adult child.  
０　　　　　　　　Otherwise
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　Here, a single adult child is deﬁned as a child who has never married, who is not at-
tending a school/university, and who is aged between 22 and 34. In this paper, we are in-
terested in the eﬀects of the parental income on the co-residence with young single adults, 
and we want to avoid confusing such eﬀects with those of a married child who might co-
reside in order to care for his/her elderly parents.
２.２.　Eﬀects of Co-residency on Life Satisfaction of Parents and Children
　The fundamental premises of the bribe model are that parents prefer to live with their 
adult child, while adult children prefer to live on their own. NFRJ contains information on 
many aspects of the respondent’s life satisfactionrated on a scale of one to four （least satis-
ﬁed to most satisﬁed）. For parents, we use life satisfaction, marriage satisfaction, and sex 
life satisfaction as outcome variables for ordered Probit models. In addition to the co-resi-
dency dummy deﬁned in section 2.1, the other control variables include : a sex dummy, 
age, age squared, years of education, an employment dummy （1 if s/he is employed）, a 
health status dummy （1 if the health status is bad）, the number of children, an urban 
dummy and region dummies. The children’s sampleis used to estimate the eﬀects of their 
co-residency with parents on the children’s life satisfaction. The main variable of interest is 
the co-residency dummy which for the children’s sample is deﬁned as a variable which 
takes the value unity if the survey respondent lives with his/her parents and 0 otherwise. 
As the sample is limited to single people, we do not use marriage satisfaction as an out-
come variable. Given the small number of observations, we cannot use sex life satisfaction 
as an outcome variable in this analysis. The other covariates are a sex dummy, age, age 
squared, years of education, an employment dummy, a health dummy, an urban dummy 
and region dummies.
３．DATA
　Our data are drawn from the 1998 and 2003 NFRJ （KazokunitsuitenoZenkokuChousa） 
surveys. These surveys were conducted by the National Family Committee of the Japanese 
Society of Family Sociology and the Social Science and the Social Science Japan Data Ar-
chive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, 
the University of Tokyo. The surveys were conducted in January 1999 and 2004, respec-
tively. In the 1998 survey, 10,500 individuals aged between 28 and 77 as of December 1998 
were surveyed with a response rate of 66.52％ （6,985 responses）. In the 2003 survey, 
10,000 individuals aged between 28 and 77 as of December 2003 were surveyed, and the 
response rate was 63.02％ （6,302 responses）. In our analysis, the two surveys are pooled 
together.
　One of the advantages of using the NFRJ data set is that it contains rich set of informa-
tion on parents and children for both children who co-reside and those who do not. We 
can obtain information on both parents’ ages, their years of education, and their employ-
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ment status. Similarly, the survey contains information for up to the third child of the re-
spondent. The information on the children in this case includes their sex, age, years of edu-
cation, and their employment status.
　One major downside of the NFRJ surveys is that they do not contain information on pa-
rental income if the respondent is a young adult regardless of whether or not they live 
with their parents. The same is true for the children’s income when the respondent is the 
parent. We can only obtain income information for the household, the respondent, and the 
respondent’s spouse.
　Furthermore, NFRJ also contains information on the respondent’s life satisfaction and 
marriage satisfaction on a scale of one to four. These variables are used as our outcome 
variables. In addition, the survey asks the health status of the respondent and his/her 
spouse using a ﬁve point scale （from 1 （very good） to 5 （very bad））. We use health sta-
tus as one of the covariates in estimating life satisfaction equations and in estimating the 
eﬀects of parental income on the propensity to live with at least one adult child by a Pro-
bit model. We create a dummy variable which takes the value unity if in response to the 
health status question the respondent answered 4 （a little bad） or 5 （very bad）, and 0 
otherwise.
３.１.　Parents Sample
　We estimate our models using two separate samples, a parents’ sample and a children’s 
sample. For the parents’ sample, our sample is conﬁned to respondents who satisfy the fol-
lowing three criteria. First, we focus on married respondents where the husband’s age is 
40―74 and the wife’s age 38―72. This is because the Japanese legal age for marriage is 18 
for men and 16 for women. Therefore, for a father to have a 22 year old child who has 
just graduated from university he would need to be at least aged 40. For a mother, she 
would need to be at least 38. The upper age limit is set by cutting oﬀ at around the 95 
percentile. Second, we only used respondents who are currently married and who have 
never been divorced or widowed. Divorcees or widows may have children from their pre-
vious marriage, but the NFS surveys do not contain information on their previous mar-
riage. We cannot identify if a child lives with their ex-spouse. Third, we exclude all obser-
vations which do not contain all the information required in estimation.
　Both surveys ask respondents about who lives in their household. If the respondents are 
parents, the NFRJ asks respondents to indicate for their ﬁrst, second and third child if the 
child lives with the respondent. This information is used to create the dummy variable de-
ﬁned in section 2―1.
　We deﬁne a single adult child as a child who has never married, who is not in a school/
university, and who is aged between 22 and 34. This selection is used because we have to 
separate the eﬀects of a married child who might co-reside in order to care his/her elderly 
parents. When constructing the dummy variable, we also excluded co-residing children who 
are still students. Descriptive statistics for the parents’ sample are summarised in Table 1.
（　　）
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Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics （Parents’ Sample）
　　　　　N＝4115
Variables Mean S. D.
Parents’ income, million JPY  7.282 5.786
Husband’s education, years 10.776 2.224
Husband’s age, years 55.210 9.217
Wife’s age, years 52.322 8.967
３.２.　Children’s Sample
　For children’s sample, our sample is conﬁned to respondents who satisfy the following 
criteria. First, the respondent is aged between 28 and 34. The minimum age is determined 
by the criteria for respondents to the NFRJ survey. The NFRJ only surveys adults who 
are aged 28 or over. Thus, the size of the children’s sample is much smaller than the size 
of the parents’ sample. Second, the respondent is single as explained above. Third, the re-
spondent’s parents are both alive. Moreover, the parents’ must be currently married and 
never divorced or widowed. Finally, we exclude all observations which do not contain all 
the information required in estimation. Descriptive statistics for the children’s sample are 
summarised in Table 2.
Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics （Children’s Sample）
All, N＝396 Male, N＝208 Female, N＝188
Variables Mean S. D. Mean S. D Mean S. D.
Living with parents  0.773 0.420  0.760 0.428  0.787 0.410
Father’s education, years 12.722 2.178 12.654 2.281 12.798 2.061
Father’s age, years 60.636 4.309 60.875 4.376 60.372 4.229
Mother’s age, years 57.710 4.145 58.014 4.043 57.372 4.241
４．RESULTS
４.１.　Estimated Results of the Eﬀects of Parental Income on the Co-residence
　Table 3 summarises the results of estimating the eﬀects of parental income on children’s 
cohabitation with parents by the TSIV method. The results show that the signs of estimat-
ed coeﬃcients on income are generally negative. However, none of the parameters is signif-
icant. To check the robustness of these results, we also estimated a similar Probit model 
using the parents’ sample. In this case, the estimated coeﬃcient is negative and statistically 
signiﬁcant.
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Table 3 : The Estimated Eﬀects of Parental Income on the Co-residence
Two Sample Instrumental Variable Method PROBIT
ALL MALE FEMALE PARENTS（N＝6879）
Coeﬀ －0.017 －0.002 －0.033 －0.002 －0.011 0.003 －0.002
SE 　0.042 　0.045 　0.043 　0.046 　0.043 0.047 　0.000＊＊＊
Partial Elasticity －0.126 －0.012 －0.239 －0.015 －0.079 0.019
Region dummies YES YES YES YES
Time dummy YES YES YES
Note : Marginal eﬀects and their robust standard errors are shown in the Probit estimation.
＊＊＊ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1％ signiﬁcant level.
４.２.　The Estimated Results of Eﬀects of the Co-residence on Life Satisfaction
　Table 4 reports the estimates of the coeﬃcients of the co-residency variable in ordered 
probit models for life satisfaction. For the parents sample, although the estimated coeﬃ-
cient of the co-residence dummy in the life satisfaction model is not statistically signiﬁcant, 
co-residence with their child reduces their sex life and marriage satisfaction. In contrast, 
children’s satisfaction seems to be indiﬀerent to their living arrangements.
　In a sense, the results here are consistent with the results in section 4.1. Unlike Italian 
parents （Manacorda and Moretti （2005））, Japanese parents prefer to live on their own. 
Thus, the bribe model is not applicable to Japan. Rather Japanese parents may assist their 
children to become independent when there is an increase in parental income.
Table 4 : Life Satisfaction of Parents and Children
Parents
Life satisfaction （N＝5329） 　0.014
 （0.041）
Sex life satisfaction （N＝4976） －0.132＊
 （0.072）
Marriage satisfaction （N＝5360） －0.150＊＊
 （0.069）
Children
Life satisfaction （N＝423） 　0.078
 （0.124）
Note :  Standard errors in parentheses. ＊＊＊p＜0.01, ＊＊p＜
0.05, ＊p＜0.1
５．CONCLUSION
　This paper has examined whether the ‘bribe model’ is valid in Japan. We have estimated 
the eﬀects of parental income on the propensity of young adult children to live with their 
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parents, and investigatedhow co-residency aﬀects the life satisfaction of parents and child. 
The ﬁndings suggest that parental income has a negative impact on the propensity to co-
habit in Japan, which implies that Japanese parents prefer to live on their own. While chil-
dren seem to be indiﬀerent toward co-residence with their parents, co-residency has nega-
tive impacts on the marriage satisfaction and the sex life satisfaction of parents. Thus, 
privacy of parents is a normal good in Japan, and the bribe model is not applicable to the 
Japanese case.
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